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Abstract Contextualism is the view that knowledge ascriptions – utterances of sentences containing 
the word “knows” - express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. But what 
features of context determine the propositions expressed by knowledge ascriptions? According to a 
version of contextualism I call conversational contextualism, the conversational dynamics or 
kinematics determine the propositions expressed by knowledge ascriptions. In this paper I argue that 
the most sophisticated version of conversational contextualism, which is the view defended by 
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009; 2014), faces serious problems. My (very) tentative conclusion will be 
that conversational contextualism should be abandoned because of these problems. 
0. Introduction 
Contextualism is the view that knowledge ascriptions – utterances of sentences containing the word 
“knows” - express different propositions in different contexts of utterance. Consider these 
examples: 
LOW: Hannah and Sarah are discussing whether the bank is open on Saturdays. Hannah recalls it was 
open on a previous Saturday. She says “I know that the bank is open on Saturdays”. Sarah agrees. 
HIGH: Laura and Sarah are discussing whether the same bank is open on Saturdays. Sarah says “Hannah 
has been in there on Saturday before”. But Laura replies “Banks can change their opening hours. Hannah 
doesn’t know that the bank is open”. Sarah agrees.i 
Assume the bank is open. The thought is that Hannah’s knowledge ascription and Laura’s 
knowledge denial are both true, even though we can specify that Hannah’s epistemic position is the 
same in both cases (for dissent see Brown 2006; Nagel 2008; Rysiew 2001). The contextualist 
explanation is that their respective uses of “knows” have different semantic values.ii Let’s say that an 
utterance of “S knows that p” is true in a context c iff S’s evidence rules out all of the alternatives in 
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which not-p that are relevant in c, where different sets of alternatives are relevant in different 
contexts (see Blome-Tillmann 2014; Ichikawa 2011; Lewis 1996).iii The alternative in which the bank 
has changed its opening hours is relevant in HIGH (Laura and Sarah take it seriously), but isn’t 
relevant in LOW (Hannah and Sarah don’t consider it). So Hannah’s use of “knows” refers to a 
property the possession of which would allow Hannah to rule out one set of alternatives, whereas 
Laura’s use of “knows” refers to a property the possession of which would allow Hannah to rule out 
another set. Because (let’s assume) Hannah has the former property but not the latter, Hannah’s 
knowledge ascription is true, whereas Laura’s is false.iv 
Contextualism says that the semantic values of uses of “knows” depend on features of the context 
of utterance. But what features? In other words, what makes an alternative relevant (or, an epistemic 
standard appropriate)? Jason Stanley (no friend of contextualism) suggests this answer: 
On a standard account of context-sensitive expressions, their semantic contents, relative to a context, are 
determined by facts about the intentions of the speaker using that expression. On this account, the reason 
that a use of (for example) ‘that cat’ refers to a particular cat is because of the linguistic meaning of ‘that 
cat’, together with the referential intentions of the user of that expression on that occasion. Call the view 
that all context-sensitive expressions behave in this manner the intention-based view of context-sensitive 
expressions (Stanley 2005: 25). 
The intention-based view says that the set of relevant alternatives in a context is the set of 
alternatives those in the context intend to be talking about. But the contextualist need not accept 
this view. First, it may well be false. David Kaplan (1989a) has argued that the semantic values of 
uses of pure indexicals (e.g. “I”) and demonstratives (e.g. “that”) don’t depend on referential 
intentions. If Catriona says “I am tired” she refers to Catriona, not whoever she intended to refer to 
(maybe Catriona thinks she is Laurie). If I say “that café”, while pointing at Café Landtmann, I refer 
to Café Landtmann, not whichever café I intended to refer to (maybe I thought I was pointing at 
Café Central). If Kaplan is right, then the semantic values of uses of some context-sensitive 
expressions don’t depend on referential intentions.v 
Second, here’s Stewart Cohen (a prominent contextualist) on the question of what determines the 
standards: 
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This is a very difficult question to answer. But we can say this much. The standards are determined by 
some complicated function of speaker intentions, listener expectations, presuppositions of the 
conversation, salience relations, etc., by what David Lewis calls the conversational score (Cohen 1999: 
61). 
Cohen only says that speaker intentions are part of the story. Consequently, it is at best unclear 
whether he accepts the intention-based view.vi  
Cohen’s picture (based on Lewis 1979) is roughly as follows. The speakers in a conversational 
context make various conversational moves. These moves are informed by their intentions, 
expectations, presuppositions and purposes. Catriona says she “knows” that the train leaves at 3pm. 
Morven points out that they need to catch this train, and asks if Catriona has seen the latest 
timetable. Catriona says she has, and the next train is at 3pm. Laurie suggests there might be a 
problem on the track, and the train won’t leave until later. Catriona admits she can’t rule this out. As 
this conversation develops, the set of relevant alternatives expands. At first, the alternative in which 
there is a problem on the track was irrelevant (it hadn’t occurred to anyone). At the end, the 
alternative is relevant (everyone accepts it is worth considering). Their conversational moves 
determine the set of relevant alternatives. The set of relevant alternatives depends on the ‘dynamics’ 
or ‘kinematics’ of conversation. For want of a better label, I’ll call this ‘conversational 
contextualism’. Conversational contextualism is broader than the intention-based view. 
Conversational contextualism says that the set of relevant alternatives depends on conversational 
kinematics. The intention-based view says that the set depends on a particular aspect of 
conversational kinematics, viz. the speaker’s referential intentions. 
The paper has three parts. In §1 I outline the most sophisticated version of conversational 
contextualism, which is the view defended by Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009; 2014). In §2 I argue 
that conversational contextualism faces serious problems. Put briefly, conversational contextualism 
makes it too hard to count as “knowing” in contexts where the speakers have relevant false beliefs 
about the epistemic situation of the subject they are evaluating. In §3 I consider three responses to 
this objection. I argue that none of them are successful, so we have reason to abandon 
conversational contextualism. But my conclusion is not that we have reason to abandon 
contextualism. While the literature has focused on views that tie the set of relevant alternatives to 
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conversational kinematics, one can be a contextualist without tying the set of relevant alternatives to 
conversational kinematics. I finish by briefly sketching what this kind of view might look like. 
1. Conversational Contextualism 
Our question is: what makes an alternative relevant? Lewis (1996) provides a list of rules specifying 
exactly when an alternative is relevant. In this section I outline Lewis’s rules, and explain why 
Blome-Tillmann’s (2009; 2014) modified list of rules rectifies the failings of Lewis’s.  
Lewis gives us four rules (see Lewis 1996: 554-9):vii 
RULE OF ACTUALITY (RA): If an alternative in which not-p is actual, then that alternative is relevant in c.viii 
RULE OF BELIEF (RB): If the subject believes (or should believe) an alternative in which not-p is actual, 
then that alternative is relevant in c. 
RULE OF RESEMBLANCE (RRE): If an alternative in which not-p saliently resembles another relevant 
alternative (made relevant in some other way), then that alternative is relevant in c. 
RULE OF ATTENTION (RTT): If an alternative in which not-p is not ignored in c, then that alternative is 
relevant in c. 
Some comments are in order. RA ensures that a knowledge ascription is true only if the relevant 
proposition is true: “S knows that p” is true only if p is true. RB ensures that a knowledge ascription 
is true only if the subject doesn’t (or shouldn’t) believe that an alternative in which p is false is actual: 
“S knows that p” is true only if S doesn’t (or shouldn’t) believe that p is false. 
RRE is a little less clear. The basic thought is that there may be a number of respects in which an 
alternative resembles an alternative that is already relevant, and whether any of those respects are 
salient depends on the context (see Lewis 1996: 557-66). Perhaps the most serious problem with 
RRE is that it allows that there are contexts in which one can truly say that the subject in a Gettier 
case “knows” (these are contexts where the alternatives in which the Gettierised subject’s belief is 
false don’t saliently resemble actuality).ix  
Lewis’s defence of RTT is brief: 
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[RTT] is more a triviality than a rule. When we say that a possibility is properly ignored, we mean exactly 
that; we do not mean that it could have been properly ignored. Accordingly, a possibility not ignored at all is 
ipso facto not properly ignored (Lewis 1996: 559). 
However, as Blome-Tillmann (2009; 2014: Ch. 1) has argued, RTT should be rejected. I will outline 
his argument before turning to his proposed replacement for RTT. Consider this case: 
TEENAGER: Laurie is lying in bed. She hears her teenage son’s bedroom window open, so she gets up and 
looks out. She sees someone who looks a lot like her son jumping out onto the ground below. She goes 
into the bedroom and finds it empty. She concludes that her son has slipped out, and spends the night 
fuming. In fact, this is exactly what happened. In the morning she challenges him: “I know you went out 
late last night. I heard you.” The son responds: “How do you know? It’s possible that you dreamt the 
whole thing”. 
If the son continues to insist it’s possible that Laurie dreamt the whole thing (the ‘dreaming 
alternative’), then the dreaming alternative isn’t ignored. But, if it isn’t ignored, then, according to 
RTT, it’s relevant. Assuming Laurie can’t rule the dreaming alternative out, the son speaks truly 
when he denies that Laurie “knows” he went out. Because this is counter-intuitive, RTT should be 
rejected. 
TEENAGER gives us good reason to reject RTT because it shows that RTT makes it too hard for 
Laurie to count as “knowing”. In order to count as “knowing” in her present context, Laurie has to 
somehow convince her son to ignore the dreaming alternative. But this isn’t a condition Laurie 
should have to meet in order to count as “knowing” her son slipped out. Given the strength of her 
evidence, it is obvious that Laurie counts as “knowing”. As I will put it in what follows, RTT is at 
odds with epistemological orthodoxy. While epistemologists dispute whether subjects in various real 
and imaginary cases can truly be said to “know” (e.g. fake barn cases), they agree that there are a 
number of paradigm cases in which “knowledge” can truly be ascribed.x Our case is such a 
paradigm: Laurie has excellent grounds for thinking her son has slipped out, nothing funny is going 
on, and Laurie has no reason to think anything funny is going on. Sense perception doesn’t get 
much (epistemically) better than this.xi So epistemological orthodoxy says that the right thing to say 
is that Laurie “knows” her son slipped out.xii Of course, this is not to say that this is the verdict 
everyone would give, much less the verdict everyone would give if they were rational. If someone 
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had the false belief that something funny was going on – that Laurie was being tricked, say – they 
might deny that Laurie “knows”. But epistemological orthodoxy tells us that they would be speaking 
falsely in doing so, albeit for understandable reasons (this point will be important in §2).xiii 
Turning to Blome-Tillmann’s account, he replaces RTT with what he calls the ‘rule of pragmatic 
presupposition’ (RPP) (see Blome-Tillmann 2009: 249-56). To understand RPP, we need the notions 
of ‘common ground’ and ‘pragmatic presupposition’, which Blome-Tillmann takes from Robert 
Stalnaker. The basic thought is that in making their conversational moves speakers often presuppose 
that their audience has relevant information. If I say “My wife is ill” I presuppose that my audience 
is aware that I have a wife. In doing so I take it to be common ground that I have a wife (I don’t 
expect the response to be “You have a wife?”).xiv Here is Stalnaker summarizing the basic idea: 
[T]he common ground is just common or mutual belief, and what a speaker presupposes is what she 
believes to be common or mutual belief. The common beliefs of the parties to a conversation are the 
beliefs they share, and that they recognize that they share: a proposition [p] is common belief of a group 
of believers if and only if all in the group believe that φ, all believe that all believe it, all believe that all 
believe that all believe it, etc.” (Stalnaker 2002: 704). 
So Stalnaker offers these characterizations of common ground and pragmatic presupposition: 
COMMON GROUND: The common ground in a conversational context c is the body of propositions that 
all the conversational participants accept, all believe that all accept, all believe that all believe that all 
accept, and so on. 
PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION: A conversational participant S pragmatically presupposes p in c iff S 
believes p to be common ground in c. 
While Blome-Tillmann accepts this basic picture, he proposes an amendment to PRAGMATIC 
PRESUPPOSITION: 
PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION*: A conversational participant S pragmatically presupposes p in c iff S is 
disposed to behave as if she believes p to be common ground in c (Blome-Tillmann: 2009: 253). 
His reasons for doing so need not detain us here. The important point is that he uses these notions 
to formulate a replacement for RTT: 
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RULE OF PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION (RPP): If an alternative in which not-p is compatible with the 
conversational participants’ pragmatic presuppositions in c, then that alternative is relevant in c (Blome-
Tillmann: 2009: 256). 
While RPP has a lot to recommend it, two considerations are particularly important. First, it appeals 
to two notions – Stalnaker’s notions of common ground and pragmatic presupposition – that are 
independently motivated. Second, it seems to deal with TEENAGER. The case can end in one of two 
ways. Either the son realizes Laurie won’t consider the dreaming alternative, in which case he ceases 
to insist on it, and so is no longer disposed to behave as if he believes it to be common ground that 
the alternative needs to be ruled out. Or the son continues to insist Laurie dreamt it all, in which 
case we end up in what Stalnaker calls a ‘defective context’. In such contexts, it is at best unclear 
what alternatives are relevant, and at worst indeterminate. While this may not sound like an 
improvement on RTT, Blome-Tillmann argues (convincingly) that it is (see Blome-Tillmann 2009: 
268-72).xv  
There are other aspects of Blome-Tillmann’s view. While he accepts RA and RB, he proposes an 
alternative to RRE, and he thinks we need to add some additional rules (see Blome-Tillmann 2014: 
Ch. 3, 5). But RPP is the core of his view. Accordingly, my criticism in §2 will focus on RPP. While 
RPP provides a compelling account of the way in which the set of relevant alternatives depends on 
the conversational context, I will argue that it faces serious problems. 
2. Problems for Conversational Contextualism 
In this section I will argue that RPP is as much at odds with epistemological orthodoxy as RTT. I 
will start by presenting the argument. I will then explain why this problem is an instance of a more 
general problem for a certain kind of view of semantic context-sensitivity. 
Consider this case: 
REAL BARNS: Catriona and Sorcha are driving through a rural area. Their friend Morven has told them 
that there is a particularly fetching red barn in the area, so they have been looking out for it. But Catriona 
has just remembered that someone told them this is the dreaded fake barn county, where almost all of the 
barn-shaped objects are actually fake barns. However, unbeknownst to Catriona and Sorcha, this 
information is entirely false. Not only are there no fake barns here, there are no fake barns for hundreds 
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of miles. Catriona and Sorcha are discussing whether Morven actually saw a red barn in light of their 
(mis)information. Catriona says “Morven doesn’t have the skill to distinguish between real barns and all 
these fakes that are around here. So she doesn’t know that there was a red barn”. 
Catriona and Sorcha aren’t just disposed to behave as if Morven saw a fake barn, they believe that 
she saw a fake barn. Indeed, given their misleading evidence, their belief that she saw a fake barn is 
reasonable. So according to RPP the alternative in which Morven saw a fake barn is relevant. 
Because Morven can’t rule it out (we can assume she lacks the required discriminatory capacities) it 
follows that Catriona’s utterance is true.  
I would submit that this is as counter-intuitive as the verdict RTT gives about TEENAGER (I briefly 
discuss whether it is in §3). My diagnosis of the problem parallels my diagnosis of the problem with 
RTT and TEENAGER. This is a clear case in which epistemological orthodoxy says it would be right 
to say that Morven “knows”. Her belief was formed by a perceptual process that is reliable in 
normal conditions, conditions are normal, and she has no reason to think anything funny is going 
on. Sense perception doesn’t get much better.xvi Again, this is not to say that this is the verdict that 
everyone would give, much less the verdict that everyone would give if they were rational. Given 
their false beliefs, the reasonable thing for Catriona to say in REAL BARNS might be that Morven 
doesn’t “know”. But there’s a difference between it being reasonable to say something and that thing 
being true. Epistemological orthodoxy says that Catriona speaks falsely in denying that Morven 
“knows”. But RPP tells us she speaks truly. So RPP is also incompatible with epistemological 
orthodoxy. 
This problem is an instance of a general problem for a certain kind of view of semantic context-
sensitivity. In a recent paper Torfinn Huvenes & Andreas Stokke (forthcoming) argue against a view 
they call ‘information centrism’. According to information centrism, contexts can be identified with 
bodies of shared information that are characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the 
conversational participants (Huvenes & Stokke forthcoming: 1-2). As Michael Glanzberg puts it, 
according to this view: 
The context of an utterance is the collection of propositions presupposed by participants in the 
conversation at the point of utterance … The expression I winds up referring to the speaker because it 
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will be common ground among participants in a conversation who is speaking at a given time, and that I 
picks out that person (Glanzberg 2002: 337). 
To see the problem with information centrism, consider this case: 
CASTOR AND POLLUX: Castor and Pollux are identical twins, and are virtually indistinguishable. In school 
Castor was a model student, while Pollux got into trouble and was ultimately expelled. Their parents 
managed to keep this event secret, and the twins changed school. After a few years, they and their parents 
were the only ones to know about Pollux’s tainted academic history. Later in life, a series of physical 
accidents and psychological complications arose, and as a result people got the identities of the twins 
mixed up so that everyone, including themselves, came to believe that Castor is Pollux, and that Pollux is 
Castor. One day, sitting in a café with some friends, Castor feels the urge to come clean, and after taking 
a deep breath, says “I was expelled from school” (Huvenes & Stokke forthcoming: 4). 
Huvenes and Stokke think that it is intuitive that Castor’s use of “I” refers to Castor, not Pollux. So 
his utterance is false. But, because it is common ground that the speaker is Pollux, information 
centrism says that Castor’s use of “I” refers to Pollux. The problem with information centrism is 
that it ties the semantic values of uses of context-sensitive expressions to the common ground, but 
the common ground can contain relevant false propositions (here, that the speaker is Pollux).xvii As 
we have seen, the problem with RPP is it ties the relevance of alternatives to pragmatic 
presuppositions and the common ground, but the conversational participants can pragmatically 
presuppose relevant false propositions (here, that Morven saw a fake barn, because she’s in fake 
barn county). So the problem is caused by the same structural feature. The problem with RPP is an 
instance of a more general problem for views of semantic context-sensitivity that tie the semantic 
values of uses of context-sensitive expressions to features of the conversational context (common 
ground, pragmatic presuppositions) that can contain relevant false propositions.xviii 
3. Possible Responses 
In this section I will canvass three responses to my argument against RPP and conversational 
contextualism. My tentative conclusion will be that the responses can be dealt with, and so the 
argument stands. I finish by briefly adverting to a different sort of contextualism 
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First, I have been arguing against RPP, not conversational contextualism. Why can’t the 
conversational contextualist propose a replacement for RPP that deals with REAL BARNS? The onus 
is on the conversational contextualist to provide the replacement, and I am not optimistic about her 
prospects. Here’s why. Conversational contextualists hold that an alternative being relevant is a 
matter of it being appropriately related to things like the common ground, speaker intentions, 
expectations, and pragmatic presuppositions. The problem with tying the relevance of alternatives to 
the common ground is that the common ground reflects the speakers’ possibly false beliefs about 
what the world is like. Because it reflects their possibly false beliefs, the common ground can contain 
false propositions. Catriona and Sorcha deny that Morven “knows” because they falsely believe that 
she is in a fake barn case. But speaker intentions, expectations and pragmatic presuppositions also 
reflect the speakers’ possibly false beliefs about the world. So it is unlikely that conversational 
contextualism can be salvaged by replacing RPP. 
Second, one might deny that RPP’s verdict in REAL BARNS is counter-intuitive. Whether the verdict 
is generally regarded as counter-intuitive is an empirical matter, which I won’t speculate about here. 
Instead, I want to emphasise that RPP and RTT suffer from a common problem: both are 
incompatible with epistemological orthodoxy. My argument was not (just) that it is counter-intuitive 
to say that Catriona speaks truly when she denies that Morven “knows”. The deeper diagnosis was 
that epistemological orthodoxy rules that it is wrong to deny that Morven “knows”. But this was also 
the deeper diagnosis of what goes wrong with RTT in TEENAGER. What we need is an argument that 
the way in which RTT goes against orthodoxy is problematic, whereas the way in which RPP goes 
against orthodoxy isn’t.  
One might be tempted to point out the obvious difference between REAL BARNS and TEENAGER. 
REAL BARNS exploits the fact that RPP allows false but reasonable beliefs to affect which alternatives 
are relevant. TEENAGER exploits the fact that RTT allows uncooperative conversational partners to 
affect which alternatives are relevant. Perhaps the latter is problematic, whereas the former isn’t.xix 
However, it isn’t hard to construct variants on REAL BARNS where the conversational participants are 
uncooperative: 
CONSPIRACY: As before, except that Catriona and Sorcha have managed to convince themselves that the 
government has secretly been replacing real barns in the area with fake barns. But, not only is there no 
11 
 
such conspiracy, they have no actual evidence that this is going on. They are both just inclined to believe 
any conspiracy theory they come across. Catriona says “Morven thinks she saw a red barn, but we know 
better. There’s this massive conspiracy going on. She doesn’t know that there was a red barn”. 
Here, both Catriona and Sorcha are behaving in an epistemically uncooperative way. Because of this, 
RPP rules that the alternative in which Morven saw a fake barn is relevant. 
Ultimately, I suspect that arbitrating this dispute requires getting clear on the extent to which a 
semantic view of a natural language expression like “knows” is beholden to the philosophical 
theorist’s view of the extension of that expression (and vice versa). If the epistemologist says that it 
is right to say that a subject “knows”, is it a problem for the contextualist if she has to hold that 
there are contexts in which it would be true to say that the subject doesn’t “know”? It doesn’t 
necessarily have to be. Just think of the contextualist solution to scepticism, according to which 
there are contexts in which it would be true to deny that we “know” much, if anything (see DeRose 
1995). But the contextualist offers this as a solution to a deep epistemological problem. What deep 
epistemological problem is solved by holding that there are contexts in which it is true to deny that 
Morven “knows”? 
Third, one might deny that the contextualist has to give rules stating when an alternative is relevant. 
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2011) gives a nice statement of this view: 
“[M[any metasemantic questions about the role of context in picking out a modal base for knowledge 
attributions remain here unanswered. Some philosophers will be dissatisfied for this reason. In my view, 
such philosophers are demanding too much at once. To understand knowledge attributions as context- 
sensitive on the model of quantifiers, and to show that they shift in the same sorts of ways, is a 
substantive and interesting philosophical conclusion. Of course questions remain unanswered; these 
questions have unanswered analogues for quantifiers, as I’ve repeatedly emphasized in this paper. Such 
considerations, therefore, do not undermine the contextualist approach to knowledge, any more than 
they undermine the widely accepted contextualist approach to quantifier domains (Jenkins Ichikawa 2011: 
398). 
There is much that I agree with here. It would be a mistake to argue that contextualism is false on 
the basis of cases like REAL BARNS. After all, nobody would argue that “I” isn’t context-sensitive on 
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the basis of cases like CASTOR AND POLLUX. But my aim is not to argue that contextualism is false. 
My aim is to argue that the best contextualist view should not advert to features of conversational 
kinematics. So the burden is on me to suggest what an alternative account might look like.  
The contextualist says that the semantic values of uses of “knows” depend on the context. The 
problem is to specify the features of context on which they depend. In trying to answer this question 
we might profit from looking at some of the broader literature. While discussions of contextualism 
in epistemology have focused on a particular view defended by the likes of Blome-Tillmann, Cohen, 
DeRose, Ichikawa and Lewis, there are other views on which epistemic properties and/or epistemic 
vocabulary depend on contexts. Take, for instance, Helen Longino’s ‘critical contextual empiricism’, 
on which some content A which is accepted by a community C is knowledge for C just in case A 
accurately represents its intended object, is supported by the data available to C and has survived 
critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available in C (see Longino 2002: 135-6). One 
could give this view a semantic spin: uses of “knows” refer to a property the possession of which 
requires one to be in a position to satisfy certain norms. One counts as “knowing” something (e.g. a 
scientific theory) only if one can show that it is supported by the available data and survives critical 
scrutiny from as wide a variety of perspectives are available. Because different data and perspectives 
will be available in different communities, what these norms require of one depends on and varies 
with the context. While there are issues with her story (see Longino 2002: 145-65; Rolin 2011), 
Longino offers a clear and compelling answer to our basic question: we can characterize contexts in 
terms of various norms. We must meet these norms in order to count as “knowing”. Because what 
we need to do to meet the norms depends on the context, whether we count as “knowing” depends 
on the context too. 
4. Conclusion 
Conversational contextualism is the view that the semantic values of uses of the expression “knows” 
depend on conversational kinematics. In this paper I have argued against a particular version of 
conversational contextualism, on which an alternative is relevant in a context if it is compatible with 
the common ground in that context. Much like Lewis’s RTT, this view conflicts with epistemological 
orthodoxy. While I haven’t made a conclusive case against conversational contextualism, I hope this 
paper provides ample motivation for considering alternative ways of thinking about contextualism.xx 
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ix Lewis (ibid.: 557-8) took this to be a virtue of RRE. But Brogaard (2004) and Cohen (1998) show 
that it is a vice. 
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about the property referred to by uses of “knows” in the context of writing this paper. But they do 
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her son slipped out. 
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xiv Sometimes my act of saying “My wife is ill” makes it common ground that I have a wife. This 
phenomenon is known as presupposition accommodation. For discussion see Karttunen (1974); 
Lewis (1979); Stalnaker (1974). 
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alternatives. But, as Ichikawa (forthcoming: Ch. 1) emphasises, the set of relevant alternatives 
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